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INTRODUCTION 
 
Albert Einstein wrote, “Most of the fundamental ideas of science 
are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language 
comprehensible to everyone.”1 If that is true of scientific ideas, surely 
it is true of legal ideas.
2
 Sadly this has not proved true. Legal 
writing—especially legislative drafting3—is marred by obscurity. 
Reliance on loose verbs and excess words
4
 has made simple ideas 
difficult to understand and complex ideas nearly impossible to 
understand.
5 
This obscurity is especially flagrant because the purpose 
                                                 
1 
BRYAN A. GARNER, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 630-631 (3d ed. 2009) 
(quoting ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 29 (1938)).  
2 
GARNER, supra note 1, at 631.  
3 
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER ON LANGUAGE AND WRITING 171 (1st ed. 2009) 
(citing MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 22 (2d ed. 1985)).  
4 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 174 (“Few reforms would improve legal drafting 
more than if drafters were to begin paying closer attention to the verbs by which they 
set forth duties, rights, prohibitions, and entitlements.”).  
5
 GARNER, supra note 1, at 582.  
1
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of legislative drafting is to say “in the plainest language, with the 
simplest, fewest, and fittest words, precisely what” the law means.6 
Yet obscurity is a hallmark of Congress. In 1948, the average 
length of bills that made it through Congress was two and a half pages; 
today it is twenty.
7
 This is not new: in 1857, Lord Campbell criticized 
a poorly drafted statute as “an ill-penned enactment . . . putting Judges 
in the embarrassing situation of being bound to make sense out of 
nonsense, and to reconcile what is irreconcilable.”8 Nor is this 
necessary
9: “With some hard work,” drafters can transform “all-but-
inscrutable” texts into straightforward statutes.10 
The Clayton Antitrust Act
11
 is one such “all-but-inscrutable” 
statute.  It prohibits certain conduct that Congress deems 
anticompetitive: Section 2 prohibits price discrimination,
12 
Section 3 
prohibits exclusive dealing contracts,
 13
 and Section 7 prohibits 
mergers that “lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”14 In 
suits against corporations, Section 12 provides plaintiffs with venue 
and service-of-process options.
15
 It states:  
                                                 
 
6 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting J.G. Mackay, Introduction to an Essay 
on the Art of Legal Composition Commonly Called Drafting, 3 LAW Q. REV. 326, 
326 (1887)). 
 
 
7 
Outrageous Bills, THE ECONOMIST, November 23, 2013, at 32. According to 
Donald Richie of the Sentae Historical Office, a staffer who took a copy of the 2400-
page Affordable Care Act that the Senate Passed on Christmas Eve 2009 had to 
remove it from his luggage or face an excessive-baggage charge.  
 
8 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 170 (citing Fell v. Burchett, 7 E. & B. 537, 539 
(1857). Lord Campbell criticized a poorly drafted statute as “an ill-penned enactment 
. . . putting Judges in the embarrassing situation of being bound to make sense out of 
nonsense, and to reconcile what is irreconcilable.” Id.  
 
9 
Dobson v. C.I.R., 320 U.S. 489, 495 (1943) (“[T]he tax code can never be 
made simple, but we can try to avoid making it needlessly complex.”). 
 
10 
GARNER, supra note 1, at 631.  
 
11 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (1914).  
 
12 
Id. § 13.
 
 
13 
Id. § 14.
 
 
14 
Id. § 18.
  
 
15 
Id. § 22.
  
2
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Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws 
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial 
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district 
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process 
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an 
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found. 
Congress’s careless drafting raises a question: does the service-of-
process clause apply to all antitrust cases, or is it limited to those cases 
in which a plaintiff establishes venue under Section 12’s venue clause?   
The Seventh Circuit correctly answered this question in KM 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc.
16
 The court held 
that Section 12 “must be read as a package deal. To avail oneself of the 
privilege of nationwide service of process, a plaintiff must satisfy the 
venue provisions of Section 12’s first clause.”17 In other words, 
plaintiffs cannot combine Section 12’s liberal service-of-process 
provision with Section 1391’s liberal venue provision. While the court 
found Section 12’s language too ambiguous to rely on a plain-meaning 
rationale, it found nothing in Section 12’s “text, purpose, or history” to 
compel the mix-and-match approach.
18
  
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the right 
result for the right reasons. Part I provides a background on the 
relationship between federal personal-jurisdiction and venue 
provisions and the Clayton Act’s specific-to-antitrust personal-
jurisdiction and venue provisions. Part I also provides a brief history 
of private antitrust litigation and establishes the facts underlying KM 
Enterprises, Inc. Part II focuses on the two competing readings of 
Section 12. It identifies the lines of reasoning that courts have used to 
reach these two readings. And Part III argues that the Seventh Circuit 
reached the right result for the right reason. It argues that Congress’s 
obscure drafting demands a more careful and nuanced analysis. And it 
                                                 
 
16 
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718 (7th 
Cir. 2013).  
 
17 
Id. at 730.  
 
18
 Id. 
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argues that Judge Wood’s careful reasoning and plain, precise writing 
is a model for the plain-language reform that the legal profession 
sorely needs.
19
  
I. BACKGROUND  
Judge Learned Hand observed that the Clayton Act, which 
Congress passed in 1914, was designed “to permit the plaintiff to sue 
the defendant wherever he could catch him.”20 This observation 
notwithstanding, in order to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must 
establish, among other things, that the court has personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant and that venue is proper.
21
 In addition to the 
general provisions found in federal law, Section 12 of the Clayton Act 
has its own personal-jurisdiction and venue provisions that apply to 
private plaintiffs bringing suits against corporate defendants. The 
relationship between these general principles and the Clayton Act’s 
specific provisions “has become tangled over the years.”22 
A. General Federal Personal-Jurisdiction and Venue Principles 
Start with personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction refers to a 
court’s power over the parties,23 and it derives from the state, from the 
defendant’s contacts with the state, and the reasonableness of the 
assertion of judicial authority.
24
 The “mechanics for asserting personal 
                                                 
 
19 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 300 (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that 
plain-language reform is among the most important issues confronting the legal 
profession. . . . We must learn to communicate simply and directly.”). 
 
20 
Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).  
 
21 
Adam B. Perry, Which Cases Are “Such Cases”: Interpreting and Applying 
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2007).  
 
22 
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 723 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
 
23 
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).  
 
24 
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 723.
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jurisdiction”25 are found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k),26 
which provides: 
(1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of 
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant:  
 (A)  who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is 
located;  
 (B)  who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is 
served within a judicial district of the United States and not 
more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued; or 
 (C)  when authorized by a federal statute.  
(2) Federal Claims Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a 
claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or 
filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant if:  
 (A)  the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any 
state’s court of general jurisdiction; and  
 (B)  exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United 
States Constitution and laws.
27
  
Thus, subpart 1(A) provides that, subject to the constitutional due-
process limitations protected by the minimum-contacts analysis,
28
 
federal personal jurisdiction is proper whenever the defendant would 
be amenable to suit under the laws of the state in which the federal 
court sits.
29
 Subpart 1(C) provides that personal jurisdiction is proper 
if authorized by a federal statute, also subject to due-process 
limitations.
30
  
                                                 
 
25 
Id. 
 
 
26 
FED. R. CIV. P.  4(k).  
27
 Id. §§ (1)-(2).  
 
28 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
 
29
 KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 723 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). 
 
30
 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P.  4(k)(1)(C)). 
5
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Unlike personal jurisdiction, which governs a court’s power over 
a defendant, venue establishes which judicial district (among those 
that have personal jurisdiction) should hear the suit.
31
 Venue is a 
“creature of statute”32 that limits the number of potential districts 
where a defendant may be called to those that are fair and reasonably 
convenient.
33
 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute, 
provides that venue is proper in:  
(1)  a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all 
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is 
located;  
(2)  a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events 
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action 
is situated; or  
(3)  if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be 
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in 
which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
34
  
The statute provides that corporate defendants are deemed to 
“reside” in “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to 
the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in 
question.”35 And in states with multiple judicial districts—like 
Illinois—the statute limits a corporation’s residency to “any district in 
that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to 
personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there 
is no such district . . . in the district within which it has the most 
significant contacts.”36  
                                                 
 
31 
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). 
 
32 
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 724.
 
 
33 
Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180. 
 
34 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Date).  
 
35 
Id. § 1391(c)(2).  
 
36 
Id. § 1391(d).  
6
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B. The Clayton Act’s Specific-to-Antitrust Provisions 
Rule 4(K) and Section 1391 govern personal jurisdiction and 
venue generally. But, as Rule 4(k)(1(C) allows, Congress occasionally 
provides special federal rules for establishing personal jurisdiction or 
venue, or both.
37
 The Clayton Act does just that. Section 12 states:  
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws 
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial 
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district 
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process 
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an 
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
38
 
Section 12 provides for both personal jurisdiction and venue in 
the case of a corporate defendant. The first clause sets venue anywhere 
the corporation is an “inhabitant,” is “found,” or “transacts 
business.”39 The second clause provides nationwide service of process 
and, therefore, nationwide personal jurisdiction.
40
 
 Congress’s ambiguous drafting raises a question: must Section 
12’s venue and service-of-process provisions be read together as an 
integrated whole? If a plaintiff takes advantage of Section 12’s 
nationwide service-of-process provision—i.e., Section 12’s nationwide 
personal-jurisdiction provision—must he establish venue under 
Section 12 as well? Or may he “mix and match,”41 relying on Section 
12 for personal jurisdiction after he established venue under Section 
1391? The Seventh Circuit answered this question in KM Enterprises, 
Inc. and correctly rejected the mix-and-match scheme.  
                                                 
 
37 
FED. R. CIV. P.  4(k)(1)(C).  
 
38 
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1914).  
 
39 
Id.
 
 
40 
See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oy, 673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir. 2012); 
GTE New Media Servs., Inc., v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 
 
41 
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 725 
(7th Cir. 2013).
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C. The Facts: KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, 
Inc. 
KM Enterprises, Inc. (KME) is an Illinois corporation.
42
 Global 
Traffic Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Global Traffic 
Technologies, LLC (collectively GTT) are Delaware entities 
headquartered in Minnesota.
43
 The companies are competitors in a 
specialized market for devices that allow emergency vehicles to 
preempt traffic lights and pass through intersections with, rather than 
against, the light.
44
 There are two primary traffic-signal-interrupter 
technologies: one relies on optical signals, and the other uses GPS 
signals.
45
 KME sued GTT in the Southern District of Illinois, alleging 
violations of, among other things, the Clayton Act.
46
  
In its suit—the latest in a series of legal disputes47 between the 
rivals—KME alleged that GTT improperly persuades public agencies 
to specify GTT’s technology when drafting public contract 
requirements.
48
 According to KME, this tactic ensures that contracts 
will be awarded to bidders who will install GTT’s units.49 But that is 
not all: KME further alleged that GTT falsely informs these bidders 
that the optical signals are no longer available and instead offers a 
“dual” unit that houses both optical and GPS technology.50 According 
                                                 
 
42 
Id. at 721. 
 
 
43 
Id. at 721-722.  
 
44 
Id. at 722. 
 
45 
Id. 
 
 
46 
Id. 
 
 
47 
Id. In 2010, GTT filed a patent-infringement suit against KME in the District 
of Minnesota. Id. KME then filed a separate suit, also in the District of Minnesota, 
which was consolidated with the patent case. Id. Next, KME sued the New York 
State Department of Transportation and its commissioner twice in 2011 in the 
Eastern District of New York; these suits challenged the Department’s award of 
traffic-preemption contracts to vendors of GTT technology. Id. KME followed that 
suit with this suit, which it filed in the Southern District of Illinois. Id.  
 
48 
Id. 
 
49 
Id.
 
 
50 
Id.
 
8
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to KME, this bait-and-switch harms competition in the GPS market by 
locking purchasers into GTT’s technology.51 
None of GTT’s activity, however, took place in Illinois.52 While 
GTT had equipped several dozen traffic intersections within the 
Southern District of Illinois, none of the intersections had GTT’s dual 
units—the core of KME’s Clayton Act allegations.53 While GTT made 
six direct sales to buyers within the district over a four-year period, 
these sales amounted to .002% of its sales during that time.
54
 GTT 
does not install or maintain its equipment in the district; it does not 
maintain offices or agents in the district; and it does not directly 
promote its products in the district.
55
 And the public procurement 
process by which traffic-signal-interrupter contracts are awarded takes 
place in Springfield (Central District of Illinois), while the third-party 
distributor that supplies GTT’s products is located in Chicago 
(Northern District of Illinois).
56
 
GTT moved to dismiss based on (among other things) improper 
venue.
57
 The district court granted its motion on venue grounds, 
reasoning that GTT’s peripheral contacts with the district could not 
support venue under Section 1391.
58
 KME appealed, arguing that 
GTT’s contacts were sufficient to support venue under Section 1391.59 
In so doing, KME “advance[d] a theory that would allow it to short-
circuit the venue analysis by mixing and matching among the service-
of-process and venue provisions of Section 12 and Section 1391.”60  
                                                 
 
51 
Id.
 
 
52 
Id.
 
 
53 
Id.
 
54 
Id.
 
 
55 
Id. at 722-723. 
 
 
56 
Id. at 722. 
 
 
57 
Id.
 
 
58 
Id. at 723. 
 
 
59 
Id.
 
 
60 
Id. This was significant because GTT’s contacts with the Southern District of 
Illinois were insufficient to establish venue under Section 12.
 
9
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II. THREE READINGS AND TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF ONE POORLY 
DRAFTED STATUTE 
Courts have read Section 12 in either of two ways. The first 
reading would allow plaintiffs to establish personal jurisdiction under 
Section 12’s nationwide service-of-process provision and then 
establish venue through either Section 1391 or Section 12. The 
Seventh Circuit referred to this as the “decoupled” reading because it 
allows plaintiffs to decouple Section 12’s first clause from its 
second.
61
 This Comment will do the same. The second reading, which 
this Comment refers to as an “integrated”62 reading, requires plaintiffs 
to satisfy venue under Section 12 in order to use its liberal service-of-
process provision. In other words, Section 12’s clauses are an 
integrated whole. Courts have used three lines of reasoning to reach 
these two competing readings. This Section identifies and explores 
these competing and often overlapping analyses.  
A. The Decoupled Reading  
The Third
63
 and Ninth
64
 Circuits take a decoupled reading of 
Section 12’s venue and service-of-process requirements. The Ninth 
Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to address this issue in 
Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co.
65
 The case involved a lawsuit 
between Go-Video, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Arizona, and a Japanese electronics trade association made 
up of multiple manufacturing companies.
66
 Go Video sued the foreign 
companies for alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
67
 
Go-Video asserted a mix-and-match theory: it claimed that venue was 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 725.  
 
62 
Perry, supra note 21, at 1198.  
 
63 
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 
64 
Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
65 
Id. at 1407.  
66
 Id.  
 
67 
Id.
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proper in Arizona under Section 1391(d) and then served process on 
the Japanese defendants under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. 
68
 The 
district court found that personal jurisdiction and venue were proper in 
the District of Arizona under a decoupled reading of Section12; the 
court held that the Japanese defendants’ aggregate contacts with the 
United States were sufficient.
69
 The Japanese defendants appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Section 12 ought to be read as an 
integrated whole, requiring Go-Video to satisfy the venue clause of 
Section 12, not just 1391.
70
 If the defendants were right, Go-Video 
likely could not establish proper venue in the District of Arizona.
71
 
Plaintiffs argued that “such cases” in the text of the Clayton Act  
referred to all antitrust cases against a corporate defendant, not those 
in which a litigant established venue under Section 12.
72
  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It initially observed that the answer 
was not clear from Section 12’s plain language but concluded that the 
purpose of private antitrust enforcement supported a decoupled 
reading of Section 12.
73
 Because specific venue provisions supplement 
general venue provisions—i.e., Section 12 supplements rather than 
replaces Section 1391—a plaintiff may properly satisfy venue under 
either provision.
74
 The court also relied on Section 12’s legislative 
history to support its decoupled conclusion.
75
 The court thus 
concluded that Congress adopted Section 12 to “expan[d] the bounds 
                                                 
 
68 
Id. at 1407-1408.  
 
69 
Id. at 1408. 
 
 
70 
Id.
 
71
 Id. 
 
72 
Id.
 
 
73
 Id. (“[A decoupled reading] is more closely in keeping with the manner in 
which courts have traditionally defined the relationship between one statute’s 
specific venue provision and the general federal venue statutes.”).  
 74 Id. at 1408-1410.  
 
75 
Id. at 1410-1411. The Court noted that the House introduced Section 12’s 
venue provision to allow antitrust suits against a corporate defendant wherever it 
could be found. Id. And the Senate added the service-of-process provision without 
debate—specifically without any indication that it was intended to “be subject[] to 
the section’s venue provision.”  Id.  
11
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of venue” and was therefore reluctant to construe Section 12 in a way 
that would “limit[] the availability of the valued tool of worldwide 
service of process.”76 
The Third Circuit faced the same question and reached the same 
result.
77
 The case, In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Litigation, 
involved a class-action complaint
78
 that alleged that multiple foreign 
and domestic defendants conspired to fix car-paint prices in the United 
States over a seven-year period.
79
 The district court found personal 
jurisdiction over the alien defendants, construing Section 12 as 
authorizing worldwide service of process independently of its specific 
venue provision.
80
 Two of the foreign defendants appealed the district 
court’s personal-jurisdiction finding, arguing that the clauses must be 
read as in integrated whole.
81
 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.82 Like the 
Ninth Circuit in Go-Video, the Third Circuit concluded that Section 
12’s text was not dispositive.83 The court relied on Go-Video, holding 
that Section 12’s service-of-process provision “is independent of, and 
does not require satisfaction of, the specific venue provision under 
Section 12.”84 The court bolstered its conclusion by comparing its 
construction of Section 12 to its construction of Section 27 of the 
                                                 
 
76 
Id. at 1412. The court concluded that a decoupled view “is clearly the one 
more consonant with the purpose of the Clayton Act and better comports with a 
section designed to expand the reach of the antitrust laws and make it easier for 
plaintiffs to sue for antitrust violations.”
 
 
 
77 
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004).
 
 
78 
Id. at 290. The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated 
sixty-three actions filed in five states. Id. 
 
 
79 
Id. at 290, n.1, 291.   
 
80 
Id. at 291; see In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 
2002 WL 31261330, at *6-10 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002).
 
 
81 
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d at 290.
 
 
82 
Id. at 305-306. Instead of relying on its own reading of Section 12, the court 
“interprete[d] a passage in which antecedents and consequents are unclear by 
reference to the content and purpose of the statute as a whole.” 
 
83 
Id. at 295-296.
  
 
84 
Id. at 296-297.
  
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 9, Issue 1                               Fall 2013 
 
13 
 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
85
 The Third Circuit took a broad 
view of federal personal jurisdiction in the Section 27 context, holding 
that “a federal court’s personal jurisdiction may be assessed on the 
basis of the defendant’s national contacts when the plaintiff’s claim 
rests on a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process.”86  
B. The Integrated Reading: Reaching the Right Result for the Wrong 
Reasons 
Before the Seventh Circuit’s decision in KM Enterprises, Inc., two 
federal courts of appeal read Section 12’s clauses as an integrated 
whole: the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit. The D.C. Circuit
87
 
concluded that the clauses were integrated under a plain-meaning 
analysis. Part III argues that this is an incomplete analysis. The Second 
Circuit
88
 reached its integrated-whole conclusion on safer but still 
dangerous grounds; it relied on a plain-meaning analysis and, in dicta, 
further supported this conclusion with Section 12’s sparse legislative 
history. The Seventh Circuit took the analysis one step further. It 
agreed with the Third and Ninth Circuits that the text was not 
dispositive, but it concluded that an integrated reading was proper 
because it best fits with Congress’s purpose in drafting Section 12. 
                                                 
 
85 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:  
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter 
or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such 
chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in 
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts 
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of 
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be 
found. 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Date) (emphasis added).
  
 
86 
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d at 298 (citing 
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002)).
  
 
87 
GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). 
 
88 
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Part III argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the right result for the 
right reasons—Congress’s obscure drafting requires more than a plain-
meaning analysis.  
The D.C. and Second Circuits both rejected the mix-and-match 
approach reading. In GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 
a 2000 case decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the court 
held that the two clauses had to be read as an integrated whole.
89
 The 
court noted that the plaintiff did not establish that the defendants were 
inhabitants of the district, could be found in the district, or transacted 
business in the district, as required by Section 12’s venue provision.90 
Plaintiff argued that this was not a precondition to using Section 12’s 
worldwide service-of-process provision.
91
 The court disagreed. While 
it acknowledged the plaintiff’s desire to read Section 12’s venue 
provision expansively, it held that this desire did not justify 
disregarding the venue clause entirely.
92
 
“It seems quite unreasonable,” the court held, “to presume that 
Congress would intentionally craft a two-pronged provision with a 
superfluous first clause, ostensibly link the two provisions with the ‘in 
such cases’ language, but nonetheless fail to indicate clearly anywhere 
that it intended the first clause to be disposable.”93 The court 
concluded that “[a] party seeking to take advantage of section 12’s 
liberalized service provisions must follow the dictates of both of its 
clauses. To read the statute otherwise would be to ignore its plain 
meaning.”94 
                                                 
 
89 
GTE New Media Services Inc., 199 F.3d at 1350. 
 
 
90 
Id. at 1351.
  
 
91 
Id. at 1350.
  
 
92 
Id. at 1351 (“A party seeking to take advantage of section 12’s liberalized 
service provision must follow the dictates of both of its clauses. To read the statute 
otherwise would be to ignore its plain meaning.”). 
 
 
93 
Id.
 
 
94 
Id.; see also Management Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enterprises, Inc., 194 F. 
Supp. 2d 520, 531-532 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that decoupling section 12’s clauses 
“completely eviscerates any semblance of a venue inquiry in antitrust cases 
involving corporate defendants—a result this Court finds Congress could not have 
intended.”).
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Likewise, in Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine, 
the Second Circuit interpreted Section 12 narrowly, reading the statute 
as an integrated whole.
95
 There, the plaintiffs—a class of licensed 
physicians—brought an antitrust suit in the Western District of New 
York against two defendants incorporated in Michigan. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants “colluded to restrain trade in connection 
with the practice of emergency medicine . . . and to monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize the market for . . . eligible [emergency] 
doctors.”96 The district court dismissed the claim for lack of 
standing.
97
 On appeal, the Second Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in 
holding that “the plain language of Section 12 indicates that its service 
of process provision applies (and, therefore, establishes personal 
jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue provision is satisfied.”98  
In reaching this decision, the court focused on the plain meaning 
of the word “such,” as in:   
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws 
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial 
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district 
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process 
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an 
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
99
 
The court reasoned that because Congress placed the word “such” 
soon after the semicolon in Section 12, and because the common 
meaning of “such” is “having a quality already or just specified . . . of 
the sort or degree previously indicated or implied, or previously 
                                                 
 
95 
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).
 
 
96
 Id. at  414-417.
 
 
97 
Id. 
 
 
98 
Id. at 423.
  
 
99 
15 U.S.C. § 12 (Date) (emphasis added).
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characterized or described,” the two clauses had to be read as an 
integrated whole.
100
 
While the Daniel court found the plain meaning dispositive, it 
nonetheless considered the Third and Ninth Circuit’s extra-textual 
analyses.
101
 It agreed with the Third and Ninth Circuits that the 
purpose of Section 12 was the “expansion of the bounds of venue.”102 
But it echoed the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[i]n adopting 
section 12 Congress was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul 
defendants hither and yon at their caprice.”103 The court concluded 
that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Congress 
intended courts to split the two “provisions [and] combine the latter 
with an expanded general venue statute enacted decades later.”104  
The court then went on to compare Section 12’s venue and 
service-of-process provisions to similar provisions in the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
105
 The court 
correctly noted that such comparisons are generally dangerous and,
106
 
because each provision contains different statutory text, found the 
                                                 
 
100 
Daniel, 428 F.3d at 424 (“The ‘quality’ of the cases specified in the 
provision of Section 12 preceding the semicolon is not simply that they are antirust 
cases . . . it is that they are antitrust cases against corporations brought in the 
particular venues approved by Section 12. . . . It is ‘in such cases,’ . . . that Section 
12 makes worldwide service of process available.”).
 
 
101 
Id. at 425.
  
 
102 
Id. (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1410 
(9th Cir. 1989)). 
 
103 
United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948), 
superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
  
 
104 
Daniel, 428 F.3d at 425. The court observed that Congress adopted Section 
12 to expand venue for antitrust lawsuits in light of restrictive general venue 
provisions. Id. But Section 1391, the general venue provision, is no longer as 
restrictive as it once was. Id. Thus, allowing a decoupled reading would essentially 
eliminate the venue inquiry entirely. Id. 
 
 
105 
Id. at 426. Interestingly, the district court made identical comparisons in 
reaching its decoupled reading of Section 12. Id. 
 
 
106 
Id. at 423 (citing Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 
U.S. 193, 204 (2000) (“[A]nalysis of specific venue provisions must be specific to 
the statute.”)).
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comparison unhelpful.
107
 But it nonetheless found support for its 
integrated-reading conclusion when comparing Section 12 with the 
venue and personal-jurisdiction provisions of RICO.
108
 With RICO, 
Congress chose to separate the venue and service-of-process 
provisions into separate subsections.
109
 RICO’s service-of-process 
section does not contain a limiting clause similar to Section 12’s “in 
such cases,” which, according to the court, made clear that Congress 
intended Section 1965(d) to apply to all cases brought under RICO.
110
 
The court concluded that the language and organizational differences 
between the Clayton Act and RICO make clear that “Congress was 
expressly rendering independent under RICO concepts that it had 
plainly linked under Clayton Act Section 12.”111 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REACHES THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE 
RIGHT REASONS 
The Seventh Circuit joined the D.C. and Second Circuits in KM 
Enterprises, Inc. by taking an integrated reading of Section 12.
112
 The 
court began its analysis with the text: “As the Supreme Court has 
instructed time and again, if ‘the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, 
then that meaning controls and the court’s ‘inquiry must cease.’”113 
While it agreed with the Second Circuit’s definition of “such,”114 the 
                                                 
 
107 
Id. at 426.
  
 
108 
Id. at 427 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), (d) (2000)). The court noted that the 
Clayton Act served as a model for RICO’s venue and personal-jurisdiction 
provisions. Id. 
 
 
109 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (venue), (d) (service of process)).
  
 
110 
Id.
 
 
111 
Id.
 
 
112 
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 
730 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 
113 
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
  
114
 “‘[H]aving a quality or just specified’; ‘of this or that character, quality, or 
extent: of the sort or degree previously indicated or implied’; or ‘previously 
characterized or described: aforementioned.’” 
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Seventh Circuit noted “in such cases” does not specify the “quality” of 
cases specified in the first clause.
115
 At a minimum, “such cases” must 
refer to antitrust cases brought against corporations.
116
 But because the 
venue clause is not written in adjectival terms—it provides that 
antitrust cases “may be brought” in certain districts vs. antitrust cases 
that “are brought in” those districts—it “is not apparent that these 
provisions specify the ‘quality’ of the cases referred to in clause 
two.”117 The court was thus “less confident [than the D.C. and Second 
Circuits] that the text alone drives [the] result.” 118 
But this did not convince the court that a decoupled reading was 
appropriate. It noted that decoupling Section 12 creates textual 
problems of its own: “If the clauses are not linked, then the venue 
language is superfluous,”119 a result that courts generally disfavor.120 
The court echoed the D.C. Circuit’s concern that “in order to decouple 
Section 12’s venue and service-of-process provisions, we would have 
to assume that Congress intentionally joined the two provisions with a 
semicolon, but nevertheless intended for the second provision to 
render the first ‘disposable.’”121 
                                                 
 
115 
Id. at 729 (citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 424 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
 
 
116 
Id. 
 
 
117 
Id.; see also 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3818 (3d ed. 2013)  (“The [Second Circuit’s] decision 
rests on the assumption that ‘such cases’ refers to antitrust cases against corporations 
that are brought in the approved venues, but that is not a possible referent of ‘such 
cases’ because those words nowhere appear in the clause preceding the semicolon.”) 
(emphasis in original).
  
 
118 
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729.
 
 
119 
Id. 
 
 
120 
See, e.g., Astoria Fed’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 
(1991).
  
 
121 
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729 (quoting GTE New Media Services 
Inc. v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); accord Go-Video, Inc. 
v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that this 
interpretation of Section 12 had the potential to render the venue provision “wholly 
redundant.”).
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Worse still, the Seventh Circuit noted that a decoupled reading of 
Section 12 “leads to some very odd results.”122 Such a decoupled 
reading of Section 12 “renders the venue inquiry meaningless” 
because venue is satisfied in every federal judicial district under 
subsection (c)(2).
123
 According to the court, this result runs contrary to 
Congress’s apparent intent in passing Sections 12 and 1391: that there 
be “some limits on venue, in antitrust cases specifically and in 
general.”124 
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, while Section 12’s 
language is too ambiguous to rely on the D.C. and Second Circuit’s 
plain-meaning rationale, the “practical effects of decoupling the 
clauses of Section 12 are ultimately too bizarre and contrary to 
Congress’s apparent intent for us to endorse.”125 “Thus,” the court 
concluded, “Section 12 must be read as a package deal. To avail 
oneself of the privilege of nationwide service of process, a plaintiff 
must satisfy the venue provisions of Section 12’s first clause.”126 
This is the right result, and the Seventh Circuit reached it for the 
right reasons. The fact that Congress passed Section 12 in order to 
expand venue in antitrust cases does not indicate that Congress wanted 
nationwide venue. To the contrary, it created specific limits on 
venue.
127
 And, for many corporations, these limits result in a pool of 
                                                 
 
122 
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute [that] 
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations 
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”).
  
 
123 
Id.
 
 
124 
Id. (emphasis in original). The court elaborated: “Both statutes authorize 
venue only when certain enumerated requirements are met, be it that the defendant 
“transacts business” in the district, “resides” there, or something else. It would be 
quite strange to read two statutes that place limits on venue in a manner that 
eliminates those limits.” Id. at 729-730.
  
 
125 
Id. at 730.
 
 
126 
Id.
   
 
127 United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948), superseded 
in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“In adopting § 12 Congress was not 
willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul defendants hither and yon at their 
caprice.”).  
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permissible districts much smaller than the entire United States. As the 
Seventh Circuit noted, “If something in Section 12 compelled the mix-
and-match approach, then that is what we would follow. But we see 
nothing in the text, purpose, or history of Section 12 that casts doubt 
on the result we have reached.”128  
CONCLUSION  
It is unfortunate that Section 12’s text cannot be dispositive in 
such a clear-cut issue.
129
 Indeed, it borders on absurdity that 
Congress—whose job is to say “in the plainest language, with the 
simplest, fewest, and fittest words, precisely what” the law means130—
could draft such a simple statute so poorly. But Judge Wood’s opinion 
provides a silver lining: her careful reasoning and plain, precise 
writing serve as e a model for the plain-language reform that the legal 
profession sorely needs.
131
 Legislators, judges, and lawyers would do 
well to follow suit.  
 
                                                 
 
128
 KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 730.  
 
129 
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction & Venue in Private 
Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IOWA L. REV. 485 
(1982) (Section 12 is best read as an integrated whole.). 
 
130
 GARNER, supra note 3, at 169.  
 
131
 Id. at 300 (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that plain-language reform is 
among the most important issues confronting the legal profession. . . . We must learn 
to communicate simply and directly.”).  
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